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In December 2004 China’s top political leadership agreed to 
fundamentally alter the country’s growth strategy. In place of 
investment and export-led development, they endorsed transi-
tioning to a growth path that relied more on expanding domestic 
consumption.1 Since 2004, China’s top leadership, most notably 
Premier  Wen  Jiaobao  in  his  speech  to  the  National  People’s 
Congress  in  the  spring  of  2006,  has  reiterated  the  goal  of 
strengthening domestic consumption as a major source of eco-
nomic growth.2 This policy brief examines the reasons underly-
1.  “Central Economic Work Conference Convenes in Beijing December 3 to 
5,” People’s Daily, December 6, 2004, 1, www.people.com.cn (accessed July 21, 
2006).
2.   Wen Jiaobao, “Report on the Work of the Government,” People’s Daily, 
March 14, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn (accessed March 14, 2006).
ing the leadership decision, the implications of this transition for 
the United States and the global economy, and the steps that 
have been taken to embark on the new growth path. 
China’s announced decision to transition away from growth 
driven by investment and a growing global trade surplus toward 
one more dependent on consumption is laudable. It increases the 
likelihood of China’s sustaining its strong growth of recent years, 
achieving more rapid job creation, improving income distribution 
or at least slowing the pace of rising income inequality, and reducing 
its outsized increases in energy consumption of recent years. It also 
would contribute to a reduction of global economic imbalances.
But to date China’s policy initiatives have been too modest to 
change its underlying growth dynamic. As a result China’s external 
surplus continues to balloon and, short of a US recession, seems 
likely to expand further in 2007 as well. China also is falling short 
of meeting several of its key domestic economic objectives.
SourceS of china’S economic Growth
China has been the fastest growing economy in the world over 
almost three decades, expanding at 10 percent a year in real terms. 
As a result, real GDP in 2005 was about 12 times the level of 
1978, when Deng Xiaoping launched China on the path of eco-
nomic reform (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2006a, 24). 
China is now the world’s fourth largest economy and its third larg-
est trader and highly likely, within a year, to move up a notch in 
each category. Given this stunning long-term success, why would 
China’s leadership even entertain the idea of shifting to a new 
growth paradigm?
In all economies the expansion of output is the sum of the 
growth of consumption plus investment plus net exports of goods 
and services. Expanding investment has been a major and increas-
ingly important driver of China’s growth. As shown in figure 1, 
in the first decade or so of economic reform, investment averaged 
36 percent of GDP, relatively high by the standard of develop-
ing countries generally but not in comparison with China’s East 
Asian neighbors when their investment shares were at their high-
est.  But since the beginning of the 1990s China’s investment rate 
has trended up.  In 1993 and again in both 2004 and 2005 invest-
ment as a share of GDP exceeded 42 percent, a level well above N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 6                                                                                                                                                                                  O Ct O b e r  2 0 0 6
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Note: For each country the time period is when the average rate of capital formation was the highest.
   
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2006; Council for Economic Planning and  
Development of Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1997 and 2006; International Monetary Fund, 
 International Financial Statistics, http://ifs.apdi.net/ (accessed September 27, 2006). 
the historic experience of China’s East Asian neighbors in their 
high growth periods.3 Rising investment has been fueled by a 
rise in the national saving rate, which reached an unprecedented 
50 percent of GDP in 2005.4
Consumption  growth  has  been  rapid  in  absolute  terms 
throughout the reform period, but over the last decade or so its 
relative importance as a source of economic growth has dimin-
ished substantially compared with that of investment. In the 
1980s household consumption averaged slightly more than half 
of GDP. This share fell to an average of 46 percent in the 1990s. 
But after 2000 household consumption as a share of GDP fell 
sharply and by 2005 accounted for only 38 percent of GDP, the 
lowest share of any major economy in the world.5 In the United 
3.  All of the analysis of the expenditure components of GDP, i.e., consump-
tion, investment, and net exports, is based on the revised GDP expenditure 
data for 1978 through 2005 released by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2006b) in late September 2006. 
4.  By definition, the national saving rate is equal to investment as a share of 
GDP plus the current account as a percent of GDP. In China, these were 42.6 
and 7.0 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2005. 
5.  The declining share of consumption is due to both a decline in household 
disposable income as a share of GDP and a decline in consumption as a share 
of disposable income.
States, household consumption accounted for 70 percent of 
GDP in the same year. In the United Kingdom, the consump-
tion share was 60 percent. In India it was 61 percent. 
As a result of this changing structure of demand, in 2001–
05, increases in capital investment accounted for a little over 
half of China’s economic growth, an unusually high share by 
international standards (National Bureau of Statistics of China 
2006b, 70).
In the last few years, the growth of net exports of goods and 
services has also become, for the first time in almost a decade, a 
major source of economic growth. Net exports of goods alone, 
as reported by China’s Ministry of Commerce, tripled from $32 
billion or 1.7 percent of GDP in 2004 to more than $100 bil-
lion or 4.6 percent of GDP in 2005 (National Bureau of Sta-
tistics of China 2006a, 169).6 As shown in figure 2, the net 
exports of goods and services in 2005 reflected in China’s GDP 
expenditure accounts more than doubled to reach $125 billion 
and accounted for one-quarter of the growth of the economy. 
In 2006 I estimate net exports of goods and services will reach 
6.  The ministry’s data, which are released monthly, cover goods only and 
measure imports inclusive of transportation and insurance charges. Thus the 
ministry’s annual import number differs from the data on trade in goods 
reported in China’s balance of payments in which imports, in accordance with 
standard conventions, are measured on a free on board (f.o.b) basis.
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$185 billion, and the increase in net exports of goods and ser-
vices will account for a fifth of China’s growth. The contribu-
tion of net exports to China’s growth has rarely been as high as 
in 2005–06.
rethinkinG china’S Growth StrateGy
The decision of China’s leadership at its critical annual Cen-
tral Economic Work Conference in December 2004 reflected 
the judgment that China’s growth path was not sustainable in 
the long run. This does not mean the leadership seeks to slow 
the rate of economic growth markedly. Rather they wish pri-
marily to change the structure of demand and to raise the effi-
ciency of investment. In short, they believe that rapid growth 
is more likely to prove sustainable if it is generated more by 
expanding consumption by Chinese households and less by 
surging investment by Chinese companies and a ballooning 
global trade surplus. 
While the Chinese Communist Party is hardly a transpar-
ent decision-making body, it appears that several factors under-
lay its December 2004 policy choice. First, there was growing 
evidence that investment-driven growth, or what is sometimes 
called an extensive pattern of growth, was leading to less ef-
ficiency in the use of resources. By most metrics, as investment 
growth has accelerated, the efficiency of resource use has de-
clined. Multifactor productivity growth, a critical contributor 
to economic expansion in all economies, averaged almost 4 
percent per annum in the first 15 years of economic reform 
(1978–93). While still high by international standards, this pace 
slowed to only 3 percent since 1993 (Kuijs and Wang 2005, 
2). In short, as the investment share of GDP rose, the contri-
bution of productivity improvements to GDP growth fell. In 
the words of Martin Wolf (2005), the chief economics com-
mentator for the Financial Times, the surprising thing about 
the Chinese economy in recent years is not, as so frequently 
asserted, how fast it is growing but rather, given the stupendous 
share of output devoted to investment, how slowly it is growing.
The slowing pace of factor productivity growth can be at-
tributed in part to overinvestment and the emergence of excess 
capacity in a number of important industries. China emerged as 
the world’s largest steel producer in 1996 when its output reached 
100 million metric tons, putting it ahead of both the United 
States and Japan for the first time. The industry has continued 
to grow at a torrid pace. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (2006) reported that in 2005 output reached 350 
million metric tons, and capacity was even larger at 470 million 
metric tons. Excess capacity of China’s steel industry of 120 mil-
lion tons exceeded the 112.5 million metric tons of steel output 
of the world’s second largest producer, Japan. Excess capacity will 
expand further in 2006 since additional capacity of 70 million 
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tons of steel production capacity was under construction but not 
completed in 2005, while demand growth is softening.7
As a result of excess production, steel prices by year-end 
2005 were down a quarter compared with a year earlier and by 
one-third compared with the peak levels of March.8 This decline 
in prices has dramatically transformed the profitability of the 
industry. When China’s investment rate soared between 2000 
and 2004, the demand for steel rose rapidly, and steel industry 
profits skyrocketed from less than RMB5 billion ($600 million) 
in 1999 to RMB127 billion ($15.7 billion) in 2005. But as 
excess capacity emerged, the growth of profits waned. Profits 
of steel firms doubled in 2003 and rose a further 80 percent in 
2004 but increased by only 1 percent in 2005. In the first half of 
2006, profits in the industry fell by 20 percent compared with 
the same period in 2005.9 For the year as a whole, profits are ex-
pected to fall by half, according to a Beijing securities firm. But 
the steel industry invested about RMB650 billion ($80 billion) 
in the five years 2001–05, of which less than two-fifths ($30 bil-
lion) was financed by after-tax profits. This year a decline of 50 
percent or more in industry earnings would impair the ability 
of some steel firms to service their debt. 
The situation is worse in the ferroalloy industry, where ca-
pacity utilization in 2005 was only 40 percent. Similar excess 
capacity has emerged in aluminum, autos, cement, and coke. 
For example, output of vehicles in 2005 was 6 million units, 
while capacity was 8.7 million units, with capacity for an ad-
ditional 2.2 million units under construction. Coke production 
in 2005 was 230 million tons, but capacity exceeded that by 
100 million tons, and the price of coke fell from $450 per ton 
in 2004 to only $130 per ton in 2005.10 Excess investment also 
7.  Gong Zhengzheng, “Steel Sector to Produce Slim Profits This Year,” China 
Daily, March 3, 2006, 9.
8.  Gong Zhengzheng, “Steel Profits Expected to Decline,” China Daily, Janu-
ary 26, 2006, 9.
9.   Zheng Lifei, “Soaring Industrial Profits Might Prompt Investment,” China 
Daily, July 21, 2006, 9.
10.  Wang Ying, “New Policies Looming for Fragmented Coke Industry,” 
China Daily, February 15, 2006. 
is evident in high-end property in some cities, where prices are 
now falling for the first time. Even in electric power, which was 
in acutely short supply only two years ago, excess capacity is 
expected to emerge by 2007, as additional capacity of 300 giga-
watts now under construction or planned comes on stream.11 
The second reason underlying the leadership decision to 
abandon the extensive pattern of economic development is the 
recognition that it has impeded the growth of personal con-
sumption. Personal consumption in China in 2005 was 30 per-
cent less than the level that would have been achieved if the 
household consumption share of GDP had remained at the 
level of 1990 rather than falling by more than ten percentage 
points. A useful comparison is with India. In 2004 China’s per 
capita GDP was two and a half times that of India. But because 
household consumption as a share of GDP was so much lower 
in China, per capita consumption in China exceeded that in 
India by only two-thirds.12 The ultimate purpose of economic 
growth everywhere is improvements in human welfare. By this 
standard, China is falling far below potential.
Third, and closely related to the slow growth of consump-
tion, China’s extensive pattern of development has generated 
very modest gains in employment. Between 1978 and 1993 
employment expanded by 2.5 percent per annum, but between 
1993 and 2004, when the investment share of GDP was much 
higher than in the 1980s, employment growth slowed to only 
slightly over 1 percent (Kuijs and Wang 2005). The more capi-
tal-intensive pattern of growth that emerged in the 1990s ap-
pears to have contributed to a slower pace of job creation for 
the simple reason that the steel and other industries producing 
investment goods employ far fewer workers per unit of capital 
than do light industries producing consumer goods, not to men-
tion the even less favorable comparison with the service sector.
Another reason China’s leadership wishes to transition to 
a more consumption-driven growth path is burgeoning energy 
consumption and its detrimental effects on the environment. 
Investment-driven growth has required the output of machin-
ery and equipment, and the inputs to produce them, to grow 
much more rapidly than the output of consumer goods. Rapid 
growth of output of investment goods, in turn, increases the 
demand for energy disproportionately. China’s energy elastic-
ity of GDP growth (the number of units of energy required to 
produce an additional unit of output) averaged a very modest 
0.6 in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to a substantial reduc-
11.  Liu Ping, “Overcapacity in 13 Industrial Sectors,” China Economic News, 
May 29, 2006, 5–6.
12.  Calculated on the basis of the Indian Ministry of Statistics and Program 
Implementation, National Account Statistics, available at http://mospi.nic.in; 
IMF, International Financial Statistics; and National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2006a, 34, 36, 171).
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tion in the amount of energy required to produce each unit of 
GDP. But this ratio has almost doubled in the past five years 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2006a, 147). While 
this dramatic increase has not yet been properly explained, it 
is likely that the more capital-intensive growth path has been 
a significant contributor.
Since two-thirds of China’s energy comes from coal, the 
burgeoning demand for energy generated by capital-intensive 
growth  has  increased  coal  consumption  by  two-thirds  since 
2000.  Coal  consumption  reached  more  than  2  billion  tons 
in  2005,  almost  twice  the  coal  consumption  of  the  United 
States,  even  though  China’s  economy  is  only  one-sixth  the 
size of the United States. As a result, China is now the sec-
ond largest emitter of greenhouse gas and is home to 16 of 
the 20 cities with the worst air pollution on the globe. As a 
result of the massive increase in the consumption of coal, the 
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) reported that, 
rather  than  cutting  sulfur  dioxide  emissions  in  2000–2005 
by 10 percent to 18 million tons as planned, by 2005 emis-
sions rose to 25.5 million tons, 42 percent above the goal.13 
A fifth factor motivating China’s leadership to seek a transi-
tion to a more consumption-driven growth pattern is a bit below 
the radar but nonetheless quite important. Excessive reliance on 
investment-driven growth in recent years threatens to undo the 
progress China has made over the past six years in developing a 
commercially oriented banking system. A critical component of 
this process has been the injection of almost RMB4 trillion ($500 
billion) to cover past loan losses and to raise capital adequacy to 
meet prudential standards (Ma Guonan 2006). The vast major-
ity of funding has come directly from the government. 
Excess investment in some sectors, leading to excess capac-
ity and falling prices, could create a new wave of nonperforming 
loans that would erode the substantial balance sheet improve-
ments of state-owned banks over the past few years and could 
push many city commercial banks, which on average are far 
weaker, into insolvency. The National Development and Re-
form Commission (2006) in its report to the National People’s 
Congress acknowledged, “adverse effects of surplus production 
capacity in some industries have begun to emerge. Prices for 
13.  Shai Oster, “Pollutant Takes rising Toll in China,” Wall Street Journal, 
August 4, 2006, http://online.wsj.com (accessed August 4, 2006).
the products of these industries dropped and inventories grew, 
corporate profits shrank and losses mounted, and potential fi-
nancial risk has increased.” The steel industry, just discussed, is 
but one example. 
The absence of rising nonperforming loans in the banking 
system in the past few years is not necessarily a sign that all is 
well, since China has been in a period of accelerating growth and 
corporate profits have been rising, albeit at a more modest rate 
recently in industries like steel. Distress in the banking system is 
likely to emerge, however, in any slowdown in economic growth 
over the next few years. But excess capacity is so large in some 
industries that their ability to service their debt is in question, 
even in a continuing strong macroeconomic environment.
A final factor underlining the leadership’s desire to tran-
sition  to  a  more  consumption-oriented  growth  path  is  that 
excess reliance on expansion of net exports, i.e., a growing trade 
surplus, raises the prospect of a protectionist backlash in the 
United States and other important markets for Chinese exports. 
China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, was perhaps 
the first to explicitly acknowledge this factor in its Report on 
the Implementation of Monetary Policy 2005Q2, in which it 
candidly stated that an excessive trade surplus “will escalate trade 
frictions” (People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis 
Small Group 2005, 28).
In sum, for a variety of reasons China’s top political lead-
ership and its leading economic advisory institutions by late 
2004 came to the view that sustaining China’s long-term rapid 
growth trajectory required a significant modification of the un-
derlying growth strategy. Failing such a modification they feared 
that rapid growth could not be sustained.
implicationS for the Global economy
China’s new growth strategy, if realized, would have positive im-
plications not only for China, but also for the global economy. 
As shown in figure 3, China’s current account surplus has soared 
in recent years. In 2006 China decisively surpassed Japan for 
the first time to become far and away the world’s largest global 
current account surplus country.14 China now is a major con-
tributor to global economic imbalances, along with the United 
States, which has the world’s largest current account deficit. The 
successful transition to a pattern of growth driven more by do-
14.  In 2005 China’s current account surplus was $161 billion, slightly less 
than Japan’s $170 billion. Japan’s surplus in the 12 months through July 2006 
was $165 billion, suggesting a surplus for the year as a whole about the same 
as last year’s. I estimate China’s 2005 current account surplus at $240 billion, 
based on China’s goods trade through August and estimates of the other 
components of the current account—trade in services, investment income, 
and transfers.
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mestic consumption demand entails a reduction of the national 
saving rate. That, in turn, would reduce China’s current account 
surplus. This adjustment should be facilitated by an apprecia-
tion of the Chinese currency, which would mitigate inflation-
ary pressures that would otherwise emerge from the increase in 
consumption demand. This will happen through two channels. 
First, appreciation would tend to reduce the pace of growth of 
exports and increase the pace of growth of imports, thus ex-
panding  domestic  supply.  Second,  a  more  flexible  exchange 
rate would allow the government greater flexibility in the use 
of interest rate policy (Goodfriend and Prasad 2006). As will 
be argued below, higher real interest rates are almost certainly 
necessary to reduce China’s excessive rate of investment, which 
in turn is a prerequisite to a successful transition to a more con-
sumption-driven growth path.
policieS to promote conSumption-
Driven Growth
Promoting domestic demand as a source of economic expan-
sion requires that the growth of household and/or govern-
ment consumption increase relative to that of investment and 
net exports. Policies to promote consumption can be based 
on cutting personal income taxes or increasing government 
consumption expenditures (i.e., government noninvestment 
outlays). Shifting to a more consumption-driven growth path 
in China also will require significant changes in its exchange 
rate policy. Under current conditions a more flexible exchange 
rate regime would certainly lead to appreciation of the ren-
minbi, simultaneously tending to reduce net exports and, as 
will be explained below, increasing the flexibility of the gov-
ernment to raise interest rates. The latter is a prerequisite for 
slowing the rapid pace of investment spending of recent years. 
Changes in corporate tax policy, discussed below, also offer an 
opportunity to contribute to rebalancing the sources of eco-
nomic growth in China.
In many economies, governments can increase personal 
consumption through fiscal stimulus in the form of tax cuts on 
household income. But, as will be discussed, this avenue is of 
limited relevance in China, where direct taxes on households 
are relatively small to start with and the government’s cuts have 
been timid. 
The alternative form of fiscal expansion is expenditure-
based. If tax cuts cannot increase private consumption sig-
nificantly, the government can increase its budgetary expen-
ditures to add to domestic demand. Given already high levels 
of investment and the emergence of excess capacity in many 
industries, however, the government needs to increase its non-
investment outlays, notably those on health, education, wel-
fare, and pensions. There is enormous scope to do so, since 
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governments at all levels combined in China spend only about 
3.5 percent of GDP on these programs (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2005, 278).15 
The government has considerable scope to increase its own 
consumption  expenditures  without  raising  taxes  on  house-
holds,  which  likely  would  depress  household  consumption, 
offsetting to some degree the increase in government consump-
tion. The government could simply reduce its own investment 
expenditures and reallocate the funds to consumption.16 The 
government itself directly undertakes about 5 percent of all in-
vestment  (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2006a, 52). 
In addition, the government budget allocates substantial addi-
tional funds, called “capital transfers,” that are used to finance 
investment expenditures.17 For 2003, the most recent year for 
which data have been released, these capital transfers were the 
equivalent of 10 percent of all fixed investment.18 There is no 
evidence  that  capital  transfers  have  been  reduced  in  recent 
years, so the government’s direct and indirect investment out-
lays combined probably amount to about 7 to 8 percent of 
GDP. A reduction in the government’s direct investment and 
cutting capital transfers would free up resources to increase 
government consumption—i.e., outlays for health, education, 
welfare, and pensions. That would contribute significantly to a 
rebalancing of the structure of demand, away from investment 
and toward consumption.
An increase in household consumption as a share of GDP 
also could contribute significantly to the transition to a more 
domestic consumption-driven growth path. That, in turn, re-
quires a reduction in the saving rate of households, which has 
increased significantly since the 1980s and has been running 
at about 25 percent of disposable income since 2000 (Kuijs 
2006). By contrast, in the United States in 2005 households 
spent more than their disposable income, i.e., the saving rate 
was slightly negative! 
Any analysis of the likelihood of a reduction in the sav-
ing rate of households must begin by analyzing the motives for 
household saving. One motivation is clearly precautionary—to 
cope with life’s uncertainties such as illness, unemployment, or 
injury. Increasingly, as the government and enterprises have 
reduced the support they provide, this expenditure has become 
an individual responsibility. In urban areas only about half the 
15.  Excluding capital expenditures.
16.  This reallocation, of course, would reduce government savings since the 
latter are defined as current revenues less current (i.e., noninvestment) outlays.
17.  Kuijs (2006, 7) believes these funds are transferred to enterprises in 
electric power, water, transport, and other infrastructure sectors.
18.  See “Flow of Funds Table (Physical Transactions, 2003),” in National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (2006b, 88–89).
population, for example, is covered by basic health insurance 
(OECD 2005, 185), and in rural areas less than a fifth of the 
population is covered by a cooperative health insurance pro-
gram initiated on a trial basis in 2002. As the share of health 
expenditures paid directly by the government or borne by en-
terprises has waned, the share of total health outlays borne by 
individuals on an out-of-pocket basis increased from around 20 
percent in 1978 to more than 55 percent by 2003 (IMF 2006, 
49; National Bureau of Statistics of China 2005, 770). As a 
consequence, many households save to cover potential future 
medical expenses. Indeed, the reduction in the share of health 
expenditures provided through the government and by employ-
ers is likely a key reason that household saving as a share of 
disposable income increased significantly in the 1990s. 
The share of China’s workforce in 2005 covered by unem-
ployment insurance is only 14 percent, and those covered by 
workers’ compensation is even lower at only 11 percent (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China 2006a, 43, 201). Thus the vast ma-
jority of workers have to save rather than rely on insurance to 
compensate for potential income interruption due to job loss or 
injury, adding further to the incentive for precautionary savings.
Another significant motivation for households to save is 
for retirement and for the education of their children. This is 
particularly true in China because the basic government pen-
sion scheme is extremely limited and government expenditures 
on education are modest. In 2005 the pension scheme covered 
131.2 million workers, only 17 percent of those employed, plus 
43.7 million retirees (National Bureau of Statistics of China 
2006a, 43, 201). Moreover, a worker must contribute for a 
minimum of 15 years before he or she is entitled to draw any 
benefits at retirement. And the basic pension scheme is designed 
to provide a pension equal to only 20 percent of average local 
wages, independent of a worker’s lifetime earnings.19
Although the authorities in China over the past decade 
have repeatedly asserted the goal of improving the social safety 
net, pension system coverage is expanding extremely slowly. Be-
tween 2000 and 2005 the share of those employed participating 
19.  The basic pension scheme, the only one to which enterprises contribute, 
is the first of a three-pillar retirement program. There are, in addition, manda-
tory and optional individual contributory pillars. The basic scheme and the 
mandatory individual schemes combined are designed to replace about 50 
percent of pre-retirement income.
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in the program rose by only 2.8 percentage points (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China 2006a, 43, 201; 2005, 117). At 
that pace universal pension coverage will not be achieved until 
2155—150 years from now!
Finally, households also save to finance education expendi-
tures. Families are responsible for a significant share  of national 
expenditures on education, since government expenditures on 
education amount to only 2 percent of GDP. In 2004 per cap-
ita expenditures on education of urban households amounted 
to RMB560 or 8 percent of total consumption expenditures 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2005, 352). Primary 
school fees are a large financial burden, particularly for poorer 
rural households. 
In the long run, of course, increased provision of health 
care, unemployment compensation, and workers’ compensation 
through the government budget can be expected to reduce pre-
cautionary saving on the part of households. As families gain 
confidence that the government will provide more of these ser-
vices, they will reduce their own saving voluntarily, i.e., increase 
consumption as a share of their own disposable income. Similar-
ly greater government provision of educational services and old 
age support could lead to a reduction in savings associated with 
lifecycle events, such as children’s education and retirement.
In  other  countries,  increased  government  provision  of 
health services has led directly to an increase in household con-
sumption (China Economic Research and Advisory Programme 
2005). For example, the introduction of National Health Insur-
ance in Taiwan, which raised the fraction of the insured popula-
tion from 57 percent in 1994 to 97 percent in 1998, substan-
tially reduced household uncertainty about future health ex-
penditures and thus stimulated increased consumption outlays. 
Households that previously enjoyed no health insurance cover-
age increased their consumption expenditures by an average of 
over 4 percent (Chou, Liu, and Hammitt 2002, 1889).20 
Thus, China’s transition to a more consumption-driven growth 
path will probably need to start with increased government con-
sumption expenditures but with time is likely to be reinforced 
by changes in household consumption and saving decisions.
For China, exchange rate policy is an important third ele-
ment potentially supporting the transition to a more consump-
tion-driven growth path. The reason is that China’s de facto 
fixed exchange rate system is a critical factor limiting the inde-
pendence of monetary policy. Although China’s central bank 
has had some success in sterilizing large foreign capital inflows, 
it has generally been reluctant to raise domestic interest rates for 
fear that these inflows could become unmanageably large. Fixed 
20.  Consumption increased by 2.6 percent in households where one spouse 
was not in the labor force or unemployed and by 5.7 percent in households 
where both spouses worked. 
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nominal domestic interest rates on loans in 2002–03, when do-
mestic price inflation was rising, led to a sharp decline in and 
ultimately to negative real interest rates on loans. Between the 
first half of 2002 through the third quarter of 2004, the real 
interest rate on loans fell by 13 percentage points, from almost 9 
to –4 percent.21 That fueled a very large increase in the demand 
for bank loans and thus a sharp increase in capital formation. 
A more flexible exchange rate policy would allow the cen-
tral bank greater flexibility in setting domestic interest rates and 
thus increase the potential to mitigate macroeconomic cycles by 
raising lending rates to moderate investment booms. That will 
lead, on average, to a lower rate of investment. A reduction in 
the rate of investment is a critical component of the policies to 
transition to a more consumption-driven growth path. In the 
absence of a reduction in investment, increased consumption 
demand would lead to inflation.
Finally, corporate tax policy should contribute importantly 
to the rebalancing of the sources of economic growth in China. 
As shown in figure 4, from 1998 through the first half of 2006 
profits of industrial enterprises in China soared from less than 
2 percent to almost 9 percent of GDP (National Bureau of Sta-
tistics of China 2005, 494; People’s Bank of China, Monetary 
Policy Analysis Small Group 2006, 33). Although these profits 
are subject to a 33 percent corporate income tax, retained after-
tax earnings of industrial firms in the first half of 2006 amounted 
to 5.8 percent of GDP compared with an estimated 1.6 percent 
in 1998.22 In addition, industrial firms retain depreciation funds 
that amount to another 6 to 7 percent of GDP (Kuijs, Mako, 
and Zhang 2005). 
21.  The real interest rate is calculated as the one-year lending rate minus the 
inflation rate reflected in the corporate goods price index. The latter index is 
compiled and published by the People’s Bank of China.
22.   Industrial sector pretax profits were RMB810 billion in the first half of 
2006 (People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group 2006, 
33). These profits are subject to the corporate income tax of 33 percent. In 
addition, China’s three largest oil producers are also subject to a windfall 
profits tax, which amounted to RMB16.19 billion in the first half of 2006. 
Thus after-tax profits can be estimated at RMB530 billion or 5.8 percent of 
reported first half GDP of RMB9,144 billion.
Unfortunately, in state-owned firms these funds are not 
subject to a significant rate of return test prior to being rein-
vested. The reason is that the only available alternative to rein-
vestment is low-yielding bank deposits. Taking into account the 
relevant measure of inflation, the real after-tax rate of return on 
corporate deposits is typically negative.23 Given a negative real 
rate of return on deposits, from the point of view of a manager 
of a state enterprise, it is rational to reinvest retained profits 
and depreciation funds even when they have slightly negative 
anticipated rates of return. 
Given the upward trend in profits as a share of GDP and 
apparent upward trend in depreciation funds as a share of GDP 
as well, retained earnings have become an increasingly impor-
tant source of investment financing in China’s corporate sector 
and have contributed to the rising investment share of GDP in 
recent years. 
For a number of years, the authorities have been discuss-
ing requiring state-owned enterprises to pay dividends to their 
owner—the government (Kuijs, Mako, and Zhang 2005). This 
policy has the potential simultaneously to reduce the pace at 
which investment grows, or at least subject investment to a more 
demanding rate of return hurdle, and to provide the govern-
ment with additional resources that could be used to enhance 
government-provided  social  services.  In  September  2006  Li 
Rongrong, chairman of China’s State-Owned Asset Supervision 
and Administration Commission, announced that the govern-
ment would begin collecting such dividends in 2007.24 While 
the magnitude of required payments has not been announced, 
if state-owned companies were to pay half their after-tax income 
as dividends, this would have amounted to 1.3 percent of GDP 
in the first half of 2006.25  The government could gain addi-
tional, larger amounts by reducing the depreciation rates used 
by firms in calculating their taxable income.
23.  For example, starting August 15, 2006, the People’s Bank of China raised 
the nominal interest rate on a one-year term corporate deposit to 2.52 percent. 
The corporate goods price index in August 2006 was up 2.9 percent compared 
with August 2005, making the real return –0.38 percent. Nominal returns 
on short-term deposits are less than 2.52 percent, as low as 0.72 percent for 
demand deposits, making the real return on deposits of less than one year as 
low as –2.18 percent. 
24.  Rick Carew, “China Expects to Collect Dividends by Next Year,” Wall 
Street Journal, September 18, 2006, http://online.wsj.com (accessed September 
18, 2006).
25.  Profits of the industrial sector in the first half were RMB810 billion. I 
assume the share accruing to state-owned and state-controlled firms was 45 
percent of the total, the share they accounted for in 2004 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2005, 494 and 497). Deducting the windfall profits tax of 
state-owned oil companies and the corporate income tax results in an estimate 
of after-tax profits of RMB233.4 billion or 2.6 percent of GDP. 
Despite much lip service to increasing 
the provision of social services 
financed through the budget, 
there is little evidence that a 
fundamental shift in government 
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the trajectory thuS far
How aggressively is China adopting policies that could lead to 
a growth path that is more consumption-driven and less de-
pendent on burgeoning investment and an expanding global 
trade surplus?
Even in advance of the 2004 Central Economic Work 
Conference, which formally endorsed the transition to a more 
domestic consumption-driven growth path, the government 
initiated a program to raise farm incomes by reducing the ag-
ricultural tax, long levied on farm income (Ministry of Fi-
nance, Ministry of Agriculture, and State Tax Bureau). In 2004 
the tax, which was set at 8.4 percent of average yields, was 
eliminated in two provinces and reduced by three percentage 
points in 11 provinces and by one percentage point in all other 
provinces.26 By the end of 2005 the government had elimi-
nated the tax in 28 provincial-level administrative units and 
had reduced it to less than 2 percent in the remaining three 
provinces, where the tax will be eliminated entirely in 2006 
(State Tax Bureau 2005b). 
The early initiative to eliminate the agricultural tax was fol-
lowed in 2006 with a doubling to RMB1,600, of the monthly 
income exempt from the personal income tax levied on wage 
earners, who live almost exclusively in urban areas. The cen-
tral government has encouraged local governments to raise the 
minimum wage in urban areas, potentially increasing the con-
sumption of low-income workers.
All of these initiatives, however, are quite modest. Ag-
ricultural taxes collected fell from RMB33.7 billion in 2003 
to RMB19.79 billion in 2004 and then to only RMB1.279 
billion in 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2005, 
281; 2006a, 75). The tax burden on farmers was reduced by 
RMB23.4 billion in 2004 and an additional RMB22 billion 
in 2005 (Ministry of Finance 2005; State Tax Bureau 2005b). 
However, RMB23.4 billion is the equivalent of only 1 percent 
of rural consumption expenditure or 0.1 percent of GDP in 
2004. More importantly, the cut in the agricultural tax was off-
26.  In 2004 the tax was eliminated in Jilin and Heilongqiang provinces, cut 
by 3 percentage points in 11 other grain-growing provinces (Hebei, Inner 
Mongolia, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hu-
nan, and Sichuan), and reduced by 1 percentage point in all other provinces.
set by record increases in other taxes levied on rural residents. 
In 2004 proceeds from the tax on occupied, cultivated land and 
the tax levied on contracts used to transfer land use rights or 
the sale, exchange, and inheritance of houses increased by one-
half or RMB21 billion. The same taxes rose by an additional 
one-third or RMB22 billion in 2005. These increases entirely 
offset the reductions in the agricultural tax (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2005, 281; 2006a, 75). 
Similarly, reductions in the personal income tax are not 
a very potent policy instrument. The proceeds of the personal 
income tax in 2005 amounted to RMB210 billion, only 1.1 
percent of GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2006a, 
20, 66). By comparison, the personal income tax in the Unit-
ed States prior to the major income tax cut under President 
George W. Bush in 2001 represented almost 10 percent of 
GDP. Tax cuts reduced this share to about 7 percent, translat-
ing into an increase in household disposable income of over 4 
percent. China starts with an income tax one-tenth the relative 
size of that in the United States, and doubling the income tax 
exemption is a modest tax cut. The State Tax Bureau (2005a) 
reports that raising the exemption will reduce the personal in-
come tax take by RMB28 billion in 2006. But this is an esti-
mated 0.13 percent of GDP,27 a tiny amount compared with 
the Bush tax cuts, which reduced personal income taxes by 3 
percentage points of GDP. 
Finally, it is quite unlikely that the increase in minimum 
wages that went into effect on July 1, 2006, in most admin-
istrative jurisdictions will have a significant positive effect on 
household consumption expenditures. There are two reasons 
for this. First, the Regulations on the Minimum Wage of the 
Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security (2003) give 
local  governments  considerable  leeway  in  setting  the  mini-
mum wage. In practice, in most jurisdictions, the minimum 
wage is only about one-fifth to one-quarter the average wage 
prevailing locally.28 Second, the share of the workforce earn-
ing the minimum wage appears to be quite small. In Beijing, 
for example, in 2002 minimum wage workers accounted for 
only 2.4 percent of the workforce.29 Given the low ratio of 
the minimum wage to the average wage and the small share 
of the workforce earning the minimum wage, the 6.5 percent 
27.   Assuming nominal GDP growth of 14 percent in 2006, based on GDP 
real growth of 10.9 percent and an implicit GDP deflator of 3.2 percent in the 
first half of 2006.
28.   In Beijing, in 2002 and 2003, the minimum wage was 25.5 and 23.5 
percent, respectively, of the average wage in those years. In 2004, in Shenzhen, 
the minimum wage was 18 percent of the average local wage (China’s highest). 
29.  China Statistical Information Net, “Wages of Beijing Workers and Staff 
Increase Steadily; Differentials Across Industrial Branches Expand,” www.
hebei.gov.cn (accessed July 10, 2006). 
There is little evidence of a more 
flexible exchange rate and increased 
independence of monetary policy that 
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rise in the capital’s minimum wage in 2003 could not have 
had more than a minuscule effect on the total wage bill.30 
More generally, the past decade’s data suggest that China’s 
minimum wage program has had a modest effect on house-
hold consumption. During this period the minimum wage 
in Beijing more than doubled, from RMB270 per month in 
1996 to RMB640 in 2006. In Shenzhen’s special economic 
zone the minimum wage doubled from RMB398 to RMB810 
over the same period.31 Presumably, minimum wages in other 
jurisdictions have had similar rates of increase. But over this 
period household consumption as a share of GDP has fallen 
significantly.32 
It is unlikely that the further 10 percent increase in Bei-
jing’s minimum wage in July 2006, to RMB640 per month, 
and the similar increases in other cities will significantly in-
crease wage income. Thus, even allowing for the likely higher 
marginal propensity to consume of minimum wage workers, 
the  expected  effect  of  China’s  minimum  wage  program  on 
household consumption expenditures is likely to be small.
In summary, the cuts in taxes on rural and urban incomes 
instituted by the central government beginning in 2004 and the 
increases in minimum wage levels introduced by provincial and 
local governments have had and are likely to continue to have a 
modest effect on household income, and thus they are unlikely 
to lead to significantly higher levels of household consumption 
expenditures. The cuts in taxes on urban and rural incomes are 
too small, and in rural areas they have been offset by increases 
in other taxes.
On the expenditure side, at the annual meeting of Chi-
na’s legislative body in the spring of 2006 the government an-
nounced increased outlays on a number of social programs. 
The centerpiece of this effort is Premier Wen Jiaobao’s program 
to create a “new socialist countryside.” The government has 
budgeted in 2006 for increased subsidies for grain producers, 
which will raise the incomes of some of China’s poorest farm-
ers; expanded coverage of the rural cooperative medical sys-
tem, which was first rolled out in 2002; and announced that by 
2007 it will eliminate educational fees for rural primary educa-
tion. Other social initiatives were also unveiled.
30.  In 2002 the share of Beijing’s wage income earned by minimum wage 
workers can be estimated as 0.6 percent of total wage income (0.25 x 0.024). 
Assuming generously that the 6.5 percent increase in the minimum wage in 
2003 had no effect on the number of minimum wage workers employed, the 
increase in the minimum wage would have raised total wage income by 0.04 
percent.
31.  See “Historical Minimum Wage Standards,” available at www.labourlaw-
yer.com (accessed July 3, 2006).
32.   China’s minimum wage system was established in 1993.
But the budgeted increase in expenditures on these pro-
grams is far from impressive. The increase in grain subsidies 
is only RMB1 billion. The expansion of the rural cooperative 
medical system is modest, seeking to expand coverage to only 
40 percent of the rural population by 2010 and increasing the 
annual per capita government subsidies for this expansion only 
by an equivalent of $2.50. Only the provision of free rural pri-
mary education, which is budgeted at RMB220 billion ($27.5 
billion) over five years, is significant. But the overall increase in 
rural spending in 2006 is budgeted at only 14 percent, not a sig-
nificant increase from the pace of recent years and only equal to 
the growth of nominal GDP in the first half of 2006. And un-
like most years, the budget message of the minister of finance at 
the National People’s Congress did not provide a figure for total 
budgeted outlays for social programs, so it is not clear whether 
the increase in social expenditures from the government budget 
in 2006 will be faster than the nominal growth of almost 18 
percent in 2005 compared with 2004.
Finally, on the exchange rate, in July 2005 the Chinese au-
thorities launched a reform program with several components: 
an initial revaluation by 2.1 percent vis-à-vis the US dollar; an-
nouncing that the currency could fluctuate by up to 0.3 percent 
per day and that its value increasingly would be determined 
by supply and demand in the market; and asserting that the 
renminbi would be managed with reference to a basket of cur-
rencies rather than simply being pegged to the dollar. These re-
forms could have led to a more flexible exchange rate and thus 
given the People’s Bank of China greater flexibility in adjusting 
interest rates. 
But to date these reforms have not resulted in much flexi-
bility. The potential for the currency’s value to move by as much 
as 0.3 percent per day has been entirely theoretical, and massive 
government intervention in the foreign exchange market con-
tinues to prevent the currency from appreciating significantly. 
In the five months from July through December 2005, the au-
thorities purchased an average of $19 billion per month, almost 
exactly the pace of intervention that occurred in the first six 
months of the year. In 2006 the average market intervention 
increased slightly to an average of $20.4 billion in the first half 
(State Administration of Foreign Exchange 2006, 6). This di-
rectly contradicts the People’s Bank of China announcement of 
the new exchange rate system, which emphasized the increasing 
role of the market and supply and demand in determining the 
China’s transition toward more 
consumption-driven growth is 
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exchange rate. As a result, the cumulative appreciation of the 
renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar in the first year of the “new” ex-
change rate system was less than 2 percent. Finally, there is little 
evidence of pegging to a basket of currencies. In short, China’s 
exchange rate system remains a heavily managed peg to the dol-
lar and does not provide the authorities with any significant 
increase in monetary policy independence. 
One additional important development—a sharp decline 
in  borrowing  by  consumers  since  2003—suggests  that  the 
transition to a more consumption-driven growth path will be 
difficult, at least in the short run. The inability of consumers to 
borrow against future income historically has been an important 
factor contributing to a high rate of household saving in China. 
This began to change in the late 1990s, when banks started 
lending to consumers for the first time. Net annual lending to 
households grew rapidly from only RMB30 billion in 1998 to 
RMB510 billion in 2003. By the end of 2003, loans to house-
holds accounted for 10 percent of all bank loans outstanding. 
Subsequently, however, lending to households fell sharply to 
RMB435 billion in 2004 and then RMB200 billion in 2005, 
below the level of 2000.33 Banks appear more than willing to 
lend to households, so the slowdown in borrowing appears to 
reflect declining consumer confidence or perhaps a wait and 
see attitude on mortgage borrowing in many cities where sharp 
housing price increases of recent years have begun to moder-
ate and in some cases reverse. In either case the implications for 
consumption growth are adverse since home purchases typically 
lead to increased expenditures on furnishings, appliances, and so 
forth, all of which are included in consumption expenditure.
concluSion
The evidence to date suggests that the transition to more con-
sumption-driven growth is off to a slow start.  In the first half of 
2006, it appears that investment grew more rapidly than GDP;34 
33.  These data are for what Chinese sources call “household consumption 
loans,” which include loans for mortgages, car purchases, tuition, and general 
consumer credit. They do not include what are called “household economic 
loans,” which are working capital loans extended to Chinese peasants for the 
purchase of seeds, fuel, fertilizer, and other agricultural inputs. 
34.  China’s high-frequency data on investment are for “fixed asset invest-
ment.” Most observers believe that this measure includes the value of land 
sales, as well as the value of mergers and acquisitions transactions. Since these 
transactions reflect changes of ownership rather than additions to productive 
capacity, they should not be included in fixed investment. In 2005 capital 
formation, as reflected in the GDP expenditure accounts, grew by roughly 
three-quarters of the pace of growth of fixed asset investment. Assuming 
the same proportional relationship applies in 2006, the reported 30 percent 
growth of fixed asset investment in the first half would translate into an expan-
sion of fixed capital formation by about 23 percent in nominal terms, well in 
excess of the reported pace of expansion of nominal GDP of 14.3 percent. 
China’s trade surplus expanded by more than half, meaning 
that net exports as a share of GDP are still rising rapidly. Thus 
China’s external surplus continues to balloon and, short of a US 
recession, seems likely to expand further in 2007. Government 
consumption expenditures appear to be growing roughly in line 
with nominal GDP growth. Since GDP is the sum of capital 
investment,  consumption  (household  and  government),  and 
net exports, it can only mean that household consumption is 
growing more slowly than GDP. Thus household consumption 
as a share of GDP almost certainly continued to decline in the 
first half of 2006. Similarly, the government has acknowledged 
that the elasticity of energy consumption with respect to GDP 
continued to rise in the first half of 2006, extending the trend 
of the previous five years.35
The reasons government policy has thus far failed to put 
China onto a new growth path are clear. First, the tax burden 
on rural residents has not declined significantly. Second, income 
taxes paid by urban residents are too modest for cuts to have a 
perceptible effect on consumption. And despite much lip service 
to increasing the provision of social services financed through the 
budget, there is little evidence that a fundamental shift in govern-
ment spending priorities is under way. Thus the precautionary 
demand for savings on the part of China’s households persists. 
Similarly, there is little evidence of a more flexible exchange 
rate and increased independence of monetary policy that would 
allow higher domestic interest rates. Government agencies issue 
repeated directives calling for reduced investment in sectors with 
excess capacity. But even after two modest increases in interest 
rates on loans in 2006, the rates paid by corporate borrowers 
remain very low in real terms.36 In the first half of 2006 the 
increase in bank credit outstanding, almost entirely to corpo-
rate customers, was 50 percent greater than in the first half of 
2005 (People’s Bank of China 2006b). Equally important, the 
real interest rate on corporate bank deposits remains negative, 
almost insuring that state-owned companies reinvest all of their 
retained earnings, even when expected returns are low or even 
moderately negative. Finally, consumer confidence seems to be 
waning, with a marked slowdown in borrowing starting in 2004. 
All of these factors suggest that China’s transition toward more 
consumption-driven growth is likely to be substantially delayed.
That comparison strongly suggests that properly measured, the investment 
share of GDP continued to rise in the first half of 2006. 
35.  “A Failed Mid-Term Exam,” editorial, China Daily, August 3, 2006, 4.
36.  Effective August 15, 2006, the benchmark rate on a one-year loan was 
raised 27 basis points to 6.12 percent. The corporate goods price index in 
August 2006 rose 2.9 percent over a year ago, making the real lending rate 
faced by corporate borrowers only 3.22 percent, an extremely low rate in an 
economy growing at over 10 percent.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 6                                                                                                                                                                                  O Ct O b e r  2 0 0 6
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